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We make up a story to cover the facts we don't know or can't
accept .... 1
The repetitions and prevarications of mythology so fog the is-
sue that irresolvable logical inconsistencies are lost sight of
even when they are openly expressed.
2
All societies are constructions in the face of chaos. The con-
stant possibility of anomic terror is actualized whenever the
legitimations that obscure the precariousness are threatened
or collapse.3
I. INTRODUCTION
All societies being constructions in the face of chaos, all so-
cial theory issues from fear of the mob. Nothing brings this into
sharper relief than the concept of civil society, increasingly at
large across political spectrums and disciplinary divides.
Deployed by some as a heuristic category and by others as an
object of analysis, its dynamic coexistence as a political slogan
and social prescription, analytical concept and normative cate-
gory make it ripe as a site of contestation. The protean nature of
the term "civil society" may account for its current ubiquity. This
ubiquity elides distinctions between description, prescription,
and aspiration. It is often not clear whether the proponents of the
concept are empirically describing the balance of forces and dis-
tribution of power in a particular setting or are putting forward
normative claims about the desirability of a particular model of
social development. The problem is compounded by the fact that
one finds an unlikely constellation among the advocates of civil
society. They include managers of global capitalism bent upon
* Professor and Chair, Global Perspectives Group, The John Marshall Law
School, Chicago.
1. JULIAN BARNES, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN 10'/2 CHAPTERS 242 (1989).
2. EDMUND LEACH, CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS 62-63 (1974).
3. P.L. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
121 (1971), quoted in GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 66 (Kevin Attell
trans.. 2005).
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the neo-liberal agenda of rolling back the state and paving the
way for unbridled circulation and accumulation of capital, social-
ists in search of a viable political program in the post-1989 world,
and third-world intellectuals trying to move beyond the failed
postcolonial nationalist projects.
Interrogating the concept of civil society is in tune with the
theme, "Critical Approaches to Economic In/Justice," of the Lat-
Crit X Conference because cultivation and strengthening of civil
society in developing countries is often prescribed as a necessary
means of achieving economic development and political stability.
This study is informed by three of the foundational points of de-
parture of LatCrit theory. One, almost from its inception LatCrit
theory has been mindful of the intersections between the local,
national and international.4 Two, it is a cardinal posture of Lat-
Crit that social theorizing is political in nature, as it posits mod-
els of distribution of identities and rights.5 Three, LatCrit has
endorsed and cultivated a mode of theorizing that privileges the
posture and voices of the subordinated.
6
My position is that the discourse of viability of civil society
in postcolonial polities is theoretically ungrounded and helps to
further marginalize subordinated sections of the population.
These failings result from the imprisonment of dominant social
theories in Eurocentric unilinear evolutionism, an imprisonment
that blinds one from the particulars of supposedly universal cate-
gories that issue from Europe's experience of modernity. Fur-
thermore, enthusiasm for civil society ignores the truncated
colonial career of modernity and the nature of the postcolonial
4. See generally, Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow: Marking Intersec-
tions in and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship and Latinalo
Critical Legal Theory, 40 B.C. L. REV. 349, 372 n.65 (1998); Elizabeth M. Iglesias &
Francisco Vfldes, LatCrit at Five: Institutionalizing a Post-Subordination Future, 78
DENV. U. L. REV. 1249, 1279-88 (2001); Pedro A. Malavet, LatCritical Encounters
with Culture, in North-South Frameworks, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2003); Ediberto Ro-
man, LatCrit VI, Outsider Jurisprudence and Looking Beyond Imagined Borders, 55
FLA. L. REV. 583 (2003). Two Colloquia organized by LatCrit specifically focused on
the international setting. See Colloquium, International Law, Human Rights, and
LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177 (1996-97); The First Annual
LatCrit Summer Colloquium: Spain, the Americas and Latino/as: International and
Comparative Law in Triangular Perspective, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1
(2000-01).
5. See Gil Gott, Identity and Crisis: The Critical Race Project and Postmodern
Political Theory, 78 DENY. U. L. REV. 817 (2001); Tayyab Mahmud, Limit Horizons
& Critique: Seductions and Perils of the Nation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 939 (2005); Fran-
cisco Vildes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and Latinal
o Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 53 (1997).
6. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Rep-
arations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Francisco V6ldes, Outsider Schol-
ars, Critical Race Theory, and "OutCrit" Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as
Jurisprudential Method, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY 399 (Francisco VAldes et al. eds., 2002).
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state. In order to substantiate these propositions, I will briefly
trace the genealogy of the concept of civil society, examine the
colonial career of modernity, and analyze the nature of the state
in postcolonial settings using Pakistan as an example.
II. CIVIL SOCIETY: EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT
Civil society is not a neologism of the social scientific imagi-
nation but a term carrying its own intellectual history, a history
that casts an inescapable shadow on contemporary usages. Until
the end of the eighteenth century, the term civil society was sy-
nonymous with the state or political society, thus, reflecting its
classic origins.7 Civil society was a more or less direct translation
of Aristotle's koin~nia politikg and Cicero's societas civilis.8 Kant
saw buirgerliche Gesellschaft as that constitutional state towards
which political evolution tends.9 For Rousseau the etat civil was
the state. 10 In all of these uses, society is contrasted with the "un-
civilized" condition of humanity-whether in a hypothesized state
of nature or, more particularly, under an "un-natural" system of
government that rules by despotic decree rather than by laws.
By the late eighteenth century, liberal philosophers began to
distinguish a discrete form of civil society with quite a different
rationale. Far from defining the nature of the state, civil society
came to be seen as a means of defense against potential abuse of
political power, especially given the unprecedented concentra-
tion of power at the apex of the modern polity. For Locke,
"Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one
society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of
Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a
political or civil society. And this is done wherever any num-
ber of men, in the state of Nature, enter into society to make
one people one body politic under one supreme government
"'11
7. In order to summarize the evolution of the concept of civil society, I draw
on NEERA CHANDHOKE, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL
THEORY (1995); CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
(John Keane ed., 1988); JOHN KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY: ON THE
PREDICAMENTS OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISM, THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, AND
THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POWER (1988); JOHN
KEANE, CIVIL SOCIETY: OLD IMAGES, NEW VISIONS (1998).
8. See John Keane, Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development
of the Distinction Between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850, in CIVIL SOCIETY
AND THE STATE, supra note 7, at 35; CHANDHOKE, supra note 7, at 78-79.
9. See CHANDHOKE, supra note 7, at 82; Keane, supra note 8, at 35-36.
10. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT passim (Maurice Cran-
ston trans., 1968) (1762).
11. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 160 (J.M. Dent &
Sons 1955) (1690).
2006]
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Here a sharp distinction between the state and society is posited
as the analytical touchstone of the social contract theory of which
Locke was an early exponent.
12
The Lockean social contract theories build upon an intellec-
tual foundation posited by Hobbes, although the two use the
contractarian idea in very different ways. In contrast to the im-
plicitly benign civil society whose consent legitimates the Lock-
ean contract, the Hobbesian vision involves more of a Faustian
pact-unlimited power to the sovereign to protect civil society
from its demonic impulses. 13 The civil and political society set up
by the contract ensured civility because, unlike the uncontrolled
state of nature, this society made orderly freedom, security of
person and property, and a rational life possible. The act of con-
sent, the contract, also created a juridical society where an indi-
vidual's life and property could be protected. Locke's
architecture of modern political order, inclusive of the state and
civil society, rests on three foundations: autonomous rights-bear-
ing individuals, private property, and government by contract
limited to protecting pre-contractual rights.
The Scottish Enlightenment injected new meanings into the
concept of civil society. Here one should bear in mind that the
project under girding the Scottish Enlightenment was that of civi-
lizing a supposedly rude and uncivil populace with England serv-
ing as the model.14 For Adam Smith, civil society was the realm
not only of the system of satisfaction of material needs but also
where men had gained control over human passions through rea-
son.' 5 While the individual is seen as egotistical, his self-interest
is seen as mediated by the realization that the satisfaction of his
interests depends upon the satisfaction of interests of other indi-
viduals. Behind the metaphor of "the invisible hand" lay the rea-
soned and controlled behavior of individuals. Once reason has
conquered the inner world of man, and applied reason to the
world of nature, the path to material and moral progress is open.
An important caveat remained: the egotistical individual could
realize his capacities only in a commercial society which offered
12. For critical studies of the social contract theory and liberalism that focus on
exclusions and subordinations engendered by these social theories, see C. B. MAC-
PHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE (1962); CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); CHARLES W.
MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997); UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EM-
PIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999).
13. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.M. Dent & Sons 1914) (1651).
14. See, e.g., ARTHUR HERMAN, How THE SCOTS INVENTED THE MODERN
WORLD (2001); WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., 1983).
15. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990) (1776).
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him the freedom to nurture his personality. Commercial society
is marked not only by progress in the forces of production, but
also by manners and morals, laws and reason. In this sense civil
society is a property of commercial societies and an attribute of
"advanced nations"-nations that allow the flowering of individ-
ual subjectivity because they are supremely confident that ego-
ism and self-interest, passions and love are regulated by reason
and the recognition of interdependence.
For Adam Ferguson, there could be no market without the
rule of law, the enforcement of contracts and private property
guaranteed by the public authority. 16 In turn, the government
could not be expected to be limited unless free markets and pri-
vate property as well as free associations were able to circum-
scribe the government's capacity to intervene in the reserved
domain of its citizens. The best way to counter the corrupting
influences of power and wealth and to revive the sense of public
spirit was, therefore, to encourage the creation and strengthening
of citizens' associations.
Thomas Paine's radical polemic went a step further, assert-
ing the sovereignty of the individual and regarding government
as merely a "national association" of citizens.1 7 Only individuals
had political rights, including the right to withdraw consent from
the social contract; governments, for their part, had the duty to
serve citizens in the "common interest." For Paine, common in-
terest based on a natural human proclivity for social reciprocity
was a far more effective means of consolidating collective power
than a system of positive laws enacted and administered from
above.18
Perhaps the most articulate liberal exponent of civil society
was Alexis de Tocqueville, who drew attention to new types of
state despotism implicit in democratic rule.19 He was concerned
not only with the potential tyranny of the majority but also with
the inherent contradictions among democratic principles of free-
dom and equality. In pursuit of equality, for example, citizens
empowered the state to undertake the widespread provision of
public goods. But in so doing they inadvertently surrendered a
measure of liberty, which could result in the administrative suffo-
cation of the society. As the state expanded, so civil life became
ever more thoroughly penetrated and controlled. According to
16. See ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY
(Fania Oz-Salzberger ed., 1995) (1767).
17. See THOMAS PAINE, BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE: COMMON SENSE,
RIGHTS OF MAN, AGE OF REASON (1942).
18. Id.
19. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., 1988) (1848).
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de Tocqueville, the state should be overseen and checked by the
"independent eye of society," made up of "a plurality of interact-
ing, self-organized and constantly vigilant civil assocations [sic]"
whose functions were to nurture basic rights, to advocate popular
claims, and to educate citizens in the democratic arts of tolerance
and accommodation.2 0 For de Tocqueville, these associations in-
cluded local self-government, juries, parties and public opinion;
other civil associations might include churches, moral crusades,
schools, literary and scientific societies, newspapers and publish-
ers, professional and commercial organizations, and organiza-
tions for leisure and recreation.
Liberal thinkers, however, did not enjoy an undisputed
claim to the concept of civil society. Soon theorists using histori-
cist approaches contested their ideas. For Hegel, civil society was
not a natural condition of freedom but a historically produced
sphere of life. 21 Sandwiched between the patriarchal family and
the universal state, civil society was the historical product of a
multi-dimensional process. One of its dimensions was the spread
of commodity relations and the emergence of a market that freed
the sphere of economic relations from the weight of extra-eco-
nomic relations, and, thus, the economy from the sphere of polit-
ics. Another dimension involved the formulation of civil law
which regulated contractual relations among free and autono-
mous individuals. Yet another dimension was reflected in the de-
personalization of violence and the centralization of the
absolutist state. Because civil society was inherently conflicted
and unstable due to the competitive interplay of private interests,
especially the acquisitive urges of the bourgeoisie, Hegel argued
that civil society cannot remain civil unless it is ordered politi-
cally and subjected to surveillance by the state. Thus, only the
state could represent the unity of society and further the freedom
of its citizens and because the state sought to modify private be-
havior with the aim of enhancing the public good, its interven-
tions were by definition legitimate. The term brgerliche
Gesellschaft makes no distinction between the sphere of the
bourgeois and the sphere of the citizen. While civil society is un-
derstood as the arena of the self-seeking economic actor, Hegel
also includes within it the impulse to citizenship, the passage
from the outlook of civil society to that of the state. That is why
the sphere of civil society contains not just economic but social
and civic institutions. It includes not just the market, the system
of production and exchange for the satisfaction of needs, but also
20. See CHANDHOKE, supra note 7, at 108-10; Keane, supra note 8, at 61.
21. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RiGwr (T.M.
Knox trans., 1942) (1821).
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classes and corporations concerned with social, religious, profes-
sional and recreational life.
22
For Marx, civil society emerged "when property relation-
ships had already extricated themselves from the ancient and me-
dieval communal society. Civil society as such only develops with
the bourgeoisie ... ."23 The discovery of this sphere, and the
recognition of its central importance in history, could only come
about at a particular stage in the development of the productive
forces: the stage at which the bourgeoisie could establish an
economy that was in principle and to a good extent in practice
distinct from the state and all other regulatory bodies. Conse-
quently, Marx insisted that "the anatomy of ... civil society is to
be sought in political economy. '2 4 Civil society and state remain
dialectically joined as "structure" and "superstructure." As the
realm of economic relations, civil society was coterminous with
the socioeconomic base, as opposed to the state, which was the
political and juridical superstructure. Thus, Marx reversed
Hegel's depiction of state-society relations, seeing the state as
subordinate in its relations with civil society and its performance
conditioned by the interests of the dominant class. The leading
twentieth-century theorist of civil society, Antonio Gramsci, used
Marxist categories but arrived at quite original conclusions. 25 The
formula most commonly found in Gramsci is that the state equals
political society plus civil society. Political society is the arena of
coercion and domination; civil society, that of consent and direc-
tion. The hegemony of a ruling class is expressed through the
"organic relations" between the two realms.2 6 Gramsci empha-
sizes the central role of civil society in the manufacture and main-
tenance of hegemony. He thus sometimes narrowly equates the
state with political society, the system of direct coercive rule,
leaving to civil society the main work of organizing hegemony.
Civil society is the sphere of culture in a broad sense. It is
concerned with the manner and mores of society, with the way
people live. It is where values and meaning are established;
where they are debated, contested and changed. It is the neces-
sary complement to the rule of class through its ownership of the
means of production and its capture of the apparatus of the state.
Given the tendency of postcolonial enthusiasts of civil society to
22. Id.
23. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 26-27 (R.
Pascal ed., International Publishers 1947).
24. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND
PHILOSOPHY 43 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959).
25. See ANTONIO GRAMSCL, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quin-
tin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1971).
26. See id.
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appropriate Gramsci, it is important to note that he recognized
that an entrenched civil society is limited to contexts where capi-
talism and a liberal political order have taken root. For example,
he notes that in Czarist Russia, "the State was everything, civil
society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a
proper relation between State and civil society, and when the
State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once re-
vealed. ''2 7 Furthermore, in his analysis of the relative un-
derdevelopment of southern Italy, Gramsci concludes that even
within a single state, unequal development of productive forces
and attendant social relations may affect the viability of civil
society.
28
For Jurgen Habermas, civil society is "composed of those as-
sociations which, within the framework of the arrangements of
public spheres, institutionalize problem-solving discourses for
questions of general interest. '29 The preconditions for the emer-
gence of civil society are a plurality of life forms, public commu-
nications, and the legality of rights and regulations. According to
Habermas, the idea of a public sphere is that of a body of private
persons assembled to discuss matters of public concern or com-
mon interest.30 This idea acquired force and reality in early mod-
ern Europe in the constitution of "bourgeois public spheres" as
counter-weights to absolutist states. These public spheres aimed
to mediate between society and state by holding the state ac-
countable via "publicity." At first this meant requiring that infor-
mation about state functioning be made accessible so that state
activities would be subject to critical scrutiny and the force of
public opinion. Later, it meant transmitting the considered gen-
eral interest of "bourgeois society" to the state via forms of le-
gally guaranteed free speech, free press, and free assembly, and
eventually through the parliamentary institutions of representa-
tive government. Thus, the public sphere was designated as an
institutional mechanism for "rationalizing" political domination
by rendering states accountable to the citizenry.
Habermas' relatively recent work revolves around a basic
tension between an economic and political system and the
"lifeworld," of which civil society, in a narrow sense, would be a
27. Id. at 238.
28. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, THE SOUTHERN QUESTION (Pasquale Verdicchio
trans., 1995).
29. Jurgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 455 (Craig Calhoun ed., Thomas Berger trans., MIT
Press 1992).
30. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUB-
LIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Bur-
ger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989).
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part.31 He posits "the system" in terms of the state apparatus and
the economy as systemically integrated action fields, having a bu-
reaucratic and capitalist life of their own, and he further assumes
that they can no longer be democratically transformed from
within. Civil society in the Habermasian sense corresponds to the
institutions of sociability and discourse of the "lifeworld," as a
sort of new impersonation of the public sphere. This version of
civil society refers to voluntary associations outside the realm of
the state and the economy. Habermas even places unions, par-
ties, and above all, social movements in the "lifeworld," hoping
that they will be the bulwarks against its colonization by the sys-
tem "to erect a democratic dam against the colonializing en-
croachment of system imperatives on areas of the lifeworld.
' 32
At this point it is important to take note of an alternative
stream of Occidental social theory, exemplified by Carl Schmitt,
Giorgio Agamben, and Michel Foucault, that calls into question
the very validity of the construct of civil society even in Occiden-
tal social formations. This alternative stream posits a view of law
and sovereignty that precludes the much heralded public/private
distinction and rules out any social sphere distinct and autono-
mous from the governmental regimes of modernity.
Carl Schmitt saw politics as a conflict between friend and
enemy and questioned the liberal-constitutional theory of the
state wherein the state is subordinate to law. For Schmitt, "[t]he
concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political.
'33
The Hobbesian war of all against all remains an ever-present pos-
sibility even after the establishment of the state, so that once the
"state and society penetrate each other ... [there] appears the
total state, which potentially embraces every domain. This results
in the identity of state and society. ' 34 This schema leaves no
room for autonomy between the state and society, hence pre-
cluding the possibility of civil society. As for the much-heralded
liberal rule of law, Schmitt posits that "[t]he exception is more
interesting than the rule ... In the exception the power of real
life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become
torpid by repetition. ' 35 The exception and not the rule is founda-
tional because the "[s]overeign is he who decides on the excep-
tion."' 36 Sovereignty is seen as the supreme un-derived power of
31. See JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990).
32. Habermas, supra note 29, at 444 (emphasis in original).
33. CARL SCHMITr, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 19 (George Schwab
trans., 1976).
34. Id. at 22.
35. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT
OF SOVEREIGNTY 15 (George Schwab trans., 1985).
36. Id. at 5.
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domination, residing outside the law. The state of exception
reveals the factual primacy of the "rule of man" over the "rule of
law," as it signifies a sovereign decision uninhibited by any nor-
mative principles or constraints. This is in tune with Hans Kel-
sen's conception of the state as a legal order resting upon a
grundnorm or basic norm that cannot be derived from the system
itself.37 A legally demarcated "principle of legitimacy ... fails to
hold in the case of a revolution ... [where t]he principle of legiti-
macy is restricted by the principle of effectiveness.
'38
Giorgio Agamben takes a leaf from Schmitt to develop the
argument that the state of exception, not the rule of law, is the
paradigm of modern government.39 The state of exception consti-
tutes a "point of imbalance between public law and political
fact"40 in an "ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the in-
tersection of the legal and the political. '41 For Agamben, the
state of exception, viewed as a "no-man's-land between public
law and political fact,"' 42 is "not a special kind of law ... rather,
insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines
law's threshold or limit concept. ' 43 The argument is that the Eu-
ropean inter-state wars of the 20th century and the state of ex-
ception that accompanied and followed them, transformed
liberal democratic regimes through gradual, but sustained, ex-
pansion of executive powers. As a result, the state of exception
has become "a technique of government rather than an excep-
tional measure... [and] the constitutive paradigm of the juridical
order .... "44
Michel Foucault refuses to recognize any analytical distinc-
tion between civil society and the state. For him, "[r]elations of
power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other
types of relations (economic processes, knowledge relationships,
sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter ... [and] they
37. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders
Wedberg trans., 1961); Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup
d'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49, 106-16 (1994).
38. KELSEN, supra note 37, at 117-19.
39. See AGAMBEN, supra note 3; GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVER-
EIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
40. FRAN(;OIS SAINT-BONNET, L'TAT D'EXCEPTION 28 (2001), quoted in
AGAMBEN, supra note 3, at 1.
41. Alessandro Fontana, Du droit de r~sistance au devoir d'insurrection, in LE
DROIT DE RtSISTANCE 16 (Jean- Claude Zancarini ed., 1999), quoted in AGAMBEN
supra note 3, at 1.
42. AGAMBEN, supra note 3, at 1.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 6-7. Agamben also traces the brief history of the state of exception as
a foundational construct in modern constitutions since the French Revolution. See
id. at 11-22.
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have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play. '45
In the modern disciplinary and governmental society, the lines of
power extend throughout social space in the channels created by
institutions traditionally located in the civil society. The exertion
of power is organized through deployments that are at once ideo-
logical, institutional, and corporeal. In this framework, the state
is not properly understood as the transcendent source of power
relations in society. Rather, it is the dispersed, localized and dis-
jointed nature of power that is important in the study of the prac-
tices of everyday life.
Rejecting a top-down analysis of power that starts with the
state, sovereignty, and the law, Foucault adopts an ascending
analysis of power. Directing attention away from the visible and
formalized codes of power, he concentrates on the manner in
which individuals experience power at all sites of human rela-
tions, the manner in which the individual is constituted by these
relations, the specific forms of power acquired in specific con-
texts and its articulation through discourses, and the fact that
power is ubiquitous and immanent. Foucault asserts that "[w]hat
we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected
around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the
problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king's
head, in political theory that has still to be done. ' 46 Foucault's
work makes it clear that the institutions and enclosures of the
space beyond the juridical state constitute the paradigmatic ter-
rain for the disciplinary deployments of power in modern society,
producing normalized subjects and thus exerting hegemony
through consent in a way that is more subtle, but no less authori-
tarian, than the exertion of authority through coercion. Contain-
ment of the mob through surveillance and discipline become the
foundational organizing principles of a modern polity, precluding
any distinction between the state and civil society.
This alternative theoretical posture towards the concept of
sovereignty and power in modernity helps us to interrogate the
conventional constructions of civil society. Civil society, then, is
an idea that arose in Occidental social theory out of the same
rethinking, reframing, and reconfiguration of allegiances that ac-
companied the rise of capitalism, the secular territorial state, and
modern forms of disciplinary power. It refers to an attempt to
theorize a specific historical experience: an ongoing, uninter-
rupted tradition of a core of socioeconomic and political institu-
45. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 94 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
46. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 51, 63
(Paul Rabinow ed., 1984).
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tions in northern Europe dating back three centuries. The
institutional core consists of the following combination of politi-
cal and socioeconomic arrangements: a government which is lim-
ited and accountable and operates under the rule of law; a
market economy based on a regime of private property and pri-
vate accumulation; an array of free, voluntary associations; and a
sphere of free public debate. The concept rests on a premise that
assumes precise outlines within modern European history-that
social relations are both sustained and energized by autonomous,
secular collectives with legal personality operating within a frame
of rationalized self-referential law. Consequently, claims of the
existence of civil society in postcolonial settings must be recon-
ciled with the inescapable conclusion that the construct of civil
society is embedded in Europe's particular experience of moder-
nity, that it rests upon a classic liberal stabilization of social rela-
tions on the basis of rights, and that a capitalist economy is its
indispensable precondition. Implicit in claims of civil society in
postcolonial formations are erroneous assumptions regarding the
universality of Eurocentric evolutionist history, the validity of
civilizing claims of colonialism, and the benign nature of the
postcolonial state.
III. EUROCENTRICISM AND THE COLONIAL CAREER
OF MODERNITY
Claims that civil society is viable in postcolonial formations
constitute part of an imagined re-creation of one of the stages of
history that Europe has already passed through-the historical
processes of development and consolidation of capitalism. This
posture is marked by a unilinear evolutionist perspective
whereby a historical process unfolding under concrete condi-
tions-seventeenth to twentieth century Europe-is presented as a
universal path upon which all subsequent social developments
are fated to tread. The outcome is history by analogy rather than
history as process. This imperialism of categories born of termi-
nal vocabularies 47 and grand narratives of modernity ensures that
a particular reality has meaning only in so far as it can be seen to
reflect a particular stage in the development of European history.
Here, the European experience of modernity is taken as a uni-
versal history, and it is assumed that "it is only the concepts of
European social philosophy that contain within them the possi-
bility of universalization. ' 48 Ignoring differences within Europe,
Eurocentricism presents European historical experience in an
47. HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 125 (1994).
48. Partha Chatterjee, A Response to Taylor's "Modes of Civil Society," 3 PUB.
CULTURE 119, 119 (Fall 1990).
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idealized, mythologized, and non-contradictory form. European
political theory is taken too literally, as if it were a description of
European history rather than a prescription for its development.
Just as it holds up modern European history as a mirror in which
to gauge the significance of all other human development,
Eurocentricism also has a tendency to view its objects as lacking
the capacity to comprehend their own past as a step in develop-
ing their own history.
Containing and disciplining the masses under the guise of
making them civil(ized), then, appears to be foundational to mo-
dernity. Modernity unfolded in concert with the emergence of
capitalism and rendered the world disenchanted and imprisoned
in what Weber termed the "iron cage" of the modern economic
order.49 In his search for an antidote to this lack of stable mean-
ing and grounded legitimacy, Weber finds legalist liberalism
wanting and pines for a charismatic leader to lend the system
coherence. 50 In this scheme, the political role of the masses is
limited to acclaiming the leader who has captured power, render-
ing them passive objects rather than political actors.5' This dis-
missive attitude towards the masses was contagious and infected
the elite amongst the colonized quickly.52 To appreciate the in-
herent relationship between civilizing and civil society, one has to
be mindful that "at the origin of the creature stands not purity
. . .but purification . . . . 53 The Hobbesian Leviathan has to
continually ensure that terms of the social contract are adhered
to, lest pre-contractual brutish tendencies burst into the open;
peasants have to be hammered into Frenchmen. 54 The parallel
here is with racism, to be seen as resting not upon race but rac-
ing. The parallels between civilizing, purification, and racing are
foundational to the concept of civil society-forged against the
49. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
181-83 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
50. MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 241-45, 266-71 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
51. For a detailed discussion, see DAVID BEETHAM, MAX WEBER AND THE
THEORY OF MODERN POLITICS (1974).
52. Even Mahatma Gandhi, the veritable champion of the marginalized, on
more than one occasion expressed his frustration with (fear of?) the mob. For exam-
ple, following an India-wide tour during the anti-colonial non-cooperation move-
ment of 1920, he wrote: "[w]ith a little forethought this mobocracy, for such it was,
could have been changed into a splendidly organized and educative demonstration."
MAHATMA GANDHI, 18 COLLECTED WORKS 274, quoted in RANAJIT GUHA, DOMI-
NANCE WITHOUT HEGEMONY: HISTORY AND POWER IN COLONIAL INDIA 225 n.66
(1997). Another of Gandhi's articles was entitled Democracy "Versus" Mobocracy,
GANDHI, supra, at 240.
53. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF WALTER BENJAMIN 138
(Gershom Scholem & Theodor W. Adorno eds., Manfred R. Jacobson & Evelyn M.
Jacobson trans., 1994), quoted in AGAMBEN, supra note 3, at 61.
54. See EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF
RURAL FRANCE 1870-1914 (1976).
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backdrop of the colonial career of modernity, establishment of
civil society always entails civilizing the "Other."
Given the colonial career of modernity, it is more productive
to read colonialism and postcoloniality from the perspective of
the subordinated and the marginalized-the subaltern. The colo-
nial and postcolonial subaltern subject was brought into sharp
relief by the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group.55 Their pro-
ject aims at interrogating the hegemonic stream of historiography
that sees social change as evolutionary and posits dominant elites
as the only agents of change. Subaltern Studies posits that mo-
ments of social change are pluralized and located in confronta-
tion and resistance rather than evolutionary transition, and that
subalterns are the primary agents of change. This point of depar-
ture enables an "against-the-grain" reading of the official archive
and demands that one listen to "the small voice of history. '5
6
There is an obvious concert between Subaltern Studies and Lat-
Crit theory, in particular in their shared commitment to anti-sub-
ordination. This makes analytical approaches of Subaltern
Studies particularly productive in a critique of the concept of civil
society.
Like so many other Enlightenment concepts, the meanings
of civil society were forged on colonial terrain.57 The term "civil
society" partakes of a Eurocentric provincialism, and its con-
struction was integrally related to the construction of an uncivil
"Other." Indeed, for philosophers like Kant and Hegel the term
was not unrelated to, and in many ways legitimated, the
processes of colonial subjugation. 58 For Ferguson, the celebrated
advocate of civil(ized) society, innate deficiencies of the colo-
nized precluded their inclusion in the sphere of freedom and ci-
vility.59 The time period marked by the colonial expansion of
Europe saw the consolidation of History-a unilinear, progres-
sive, Eurocentric, teleological history-as the dominant mode of
55. See SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak eds., 1988); MAPPING SUBALTERN STUDIES AND THE POSTCOLONIAL
(Vinayak Chaturvedi ed., 2000); THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBALTERN STUDIES
READER (Ileana Rodrfguez ed., 2001).
56. Ranajit Guha, The Small Voice of History, 9 SUBALTERN STUDIES: WRIT-
INGS ON SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 1 (Shahid Amin & Dipesh
Chakrabarty eds., 1997).
57. Jonathan S. Hearn, Scottish Nationalism and the Civil Society Concept:
Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot?, 20 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 32
(1997).
58. Tsenay Serequeberhan, The Idea of Colonialism in Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, 29 INT'L PHIL. Q. 301 (1989).
59. Ferguson wrote in 1767 that Africa had a "weakness in the genius of its
people" and did not inspire "virtues which are connected with freedom, and re-
quired in the conduct of civil affairs," quoted in JOHN L. COMAROFF & JEAN
COMAROFF, Introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN
AFRICA: CRITICAL PERSPECrIVES 1 (John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff eds., 1999).
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experiencing time and of being. 60 In History, time overcomes
space-a process whereby the geographically distant Other is sup-
posed to, in time, become like oneself; Europe's present becomes
all Others' future.
61
Embodying the agenda of modernity, History constitutes a
closure that destroys or domesticates the alterity of the Other.
History as a mode of being becomes the condition that makes
modernity possible, with the nation-state posited as the agency,
the subject of History, which will realize modernity. History be-
comes a master code, something imaginary that informs the "civi-
lizing mission" of colonialism, posited as a world-historical task.
Today the fundamental postcolonial challenge is to redress Eu-
rope's "homogenizing and incorporating world historical scheme
that assimilate[s] non-synchronous developments, histories, cul-
tures, and peoples to it."62 One step towards meeting this chal-
lenge is to recognize that "repression and violence . . . are as
instrumental in the victory of the modern as is the persuasive
power of its rhetorical strategies." 63 Nothing better illustrates
this fact than the colonial career of modernity, where one can
also locate the roots of today's postcolonial maladies.
One must take issue with the Eurocentric evolutionist claim
that modern power in its colonial career simply replicates its
evolution in Europe.64 Colonialism is absolute government,
founded not on consent but on conquest. Consequently, the
modern regime of power in its colonial career was "destined
never to fulfill its normalizing mission, because the premise of its
power was the preservation of the alienness of the ruling
group. '65 The universalist claims of modernity floundered in the
colony, and the promise of the rule of law yielded to "the rule of
colonial difference, ' 66 a rule whereby, within colonial discursive
and institutional practices, the colonized are represented as infer-
ior and radically Other. The constructions of an immutable dif-
ference between the colonizer and the native, reconciled
60. See DEREK ATTRIDGE ET AL., POST-STRUCTURALISM AND THE QUESTION
OF HISTORY (1987); Ashis Nandy, History's Forgotten Doubles, 34 HIST. & THEORY
44 (1995); ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY AND THE
WEST (2d ed. 2004).
61. JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES
ITS OBJECT (2d ed. 2002).
62. Edward W. Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, in LITERATURE, POLITICS AND
THEORY: PAPERS FROM THE ESSEX CONFERENCE, 1976-1984 210, 224 (Francis
Barker et al. eds., 1986).
63. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks
for "Indian" Pasts?, 37 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 21 (1992).
64. David Scott, Colonial Governmentality, 43 Soc. TEXT 191 (1995).
65. PARTHA CHATrERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 18 (1993).
66. Id. at 16.
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colonialism's professed civilizing mission with its violence. Mo-
dernity's promise of rationality and rule of law collapsed in the
colonies, and the professed universality of European constructs
betrayed their particularity. Contradictions and ironies
abounded, as did the defenses of the gulf between rhetoric and
reality on the grounds of practicality and the exceptional circum-
stances of the colonies.
This rule of difference rendered the colonial state funda-
mentally different from the parent metropolitan state. While "the
metropolitan state was hegemonic in character with its claim to
dominance based on a power relation in which the moment of
persuasion outweighed that of coercion,.., the colonial state was
non-hegemonic with persuasion outweighed by coercion in its
structure of dominance. ' 67 This directly affected the relationship
of law with both the state and the social formation at large. In the
colony "law was a department of the executive," 68 never achiev-
ing the autonomy envisaged by liberal designs of governance
even when formally incorporated in projects of macro social en-
gineering. 69 For the colonizer, while "[o]ur law is in fact the sum
and substance of what we have to teach them ... it is a compul-
sory gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience.
'70
This ensured that, in the colony, the promise of a modernizing
transition from the "rule of force" to the "rule of law" was most
pronounced in its breach, and Enlightenment's developmental
march to reason and freedom never materialized.
The colonial state was marked by an aspiration for a com-
prehensive hegemony and the ambition to remake, in its own vi-
sion, a society deemed irremediably flawed. Colonialism
confined development of capitalism to selected sections of the
economy. Non-capitalist modes were preserved, even reinforced,
and articulated with the global economy.71 Colonialism, then,
constitutes a truncated project of modernity, a rule of essential-
ized difference between colonizer and the native, with coercion
outweighing consent as the mode of governance and law serving
as an instrument of executive power. The non-recognition of the
67. Guha, supra note 56, at xii.
68. David Washbrook, Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India, 15
MOD. ASIAN STUD. 649, 714 (1981).
69. See generally IMRAN ALI, THE PUNJAB UNDER IMPERIALISM, 1885-1947
(1988); RANAJIT GUHA, A RULE OF PROPERTY FOR BENGAL: AN ESSAY ON THE
IDEA OF PERMANENT SETTLEMENT (1963).
70. James Fitzjames Stephen, Legislation Under Lord Mayo, in W. W. HUNTER,
LIFE OF THE EARL OF MAYO: FOURTH VICEROY OF INDIA 169 (2d ed. 1876), quoted
in ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA 302 (1959).
71. See SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF
THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (Brian Pearce trans., 1974); SAMIR AMIN,
UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FORMATIONS OF PERIPHERAL
CAPITALISM (Brian Pearce trans., 1976).
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colonial fracture as foundational to modernity lends itself to the
chronic propensity to project the particular as universal, to for-
ward prescription packaged as description, and to deny the
agency of the colonized. The key lies in discerning how power is
organized in colonial formations, how its vital organizing princi-
ple is the coexistence of the language of rights with that of cul-
ture and custom, and how this is in tandem with the co-existence
of multiple modes of production such that circuits of capital ac-
cumulation are developed while retaining spheres of non-capital-
ist modes of production. This institutional legacy of how power is
organized remained largely intact through the phases of formal
decolonization and nationalist rule.
The key design of colonial organizations of power was the
system of so-called "indirect rule" or "the regime of differentia-
tion," 72 which forged specifically "native" institutions rooted in
"culture" and governed by "custom" through which the colonial
regime would rule native subjects. Mahmood Mamdani terms
this institutional segregation "decentralized despotism. ' 73 Unilat-
eral claims were a defining characteristic of the colonial state;
natives were made subjects but never citizens. This left only a
furtive, marginal space for an embryonic "civil" society. Partici-
pation in this society was limited to the urban, educated natives
like Macaulay's "interpreters between us and the millions whom
we govern. '74 The terminal stage of colonialism appeared to her-
ald activation of these pockets of civil society as part of national-
ist self-assertion. However, in retrospect, it appears that the civil
societies of the terminal colonial era were stillborn, aborted by
the combined effect of the dominant societal projects of national-
ist leadership, the exigencies of management and reproduction of
postcolonial power, and the potent legacy and logic of the colo-
nial state, which remained embedded within its successor appara-
tuses. I now turn to the configuration of postcolonial formations
to evaluate the viability of civil society there.
IV. THE STATE AND THE ELUSIVE CIVIL SOCIETY IN
POSTCOLONIAL FORMATION
A glaring omission in the discourse of civil society in
postcolonial formations is that the discourse gives little attention
to civil society's relation to the state-beyond stressing its auton-
omy and even independence from the state. This is hardly ade-
quate unless we assume that the state and civil society occupy
72. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA
AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 7 (1996).
73. Id. at 8.
74. Thomas B. Macaulay, Minute on Indian Education, in SELECTED WRITINGS
237, 249 (John Clive & Thomas Pinney eds., 1972).
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separate realms. Even Gramsci, a veritable patron saint of civil
society enthusiasts, warned against "a neglect of the moment of
political society, of force, of domination. '75 Crucial to under-
standing the structure and functioning of civil society is the fact
that these are inextricably tied to the structure and functioning of
the state. Any theory of civil society is by implication also a the-
ory of the state. The failure to recognize this fact accounts for the
rational, legal state implicitly posited by postcolonial enthusiasts
of civil society. Interrogation of civil society must be carried out
with the state as a constant reference point since civil society ac-
quires a system of meanings only in relation to the state.
Even its proponents acknowledge that a civil society free of
state regulation is neither possible nor desirable. Shils, for exam-
ple, notes that the state "lays down laws which set the outermost
boundaries of the autonomy of ... civil society. '76 He acknowl-
edges that while a free civil society "lays down limits on the ac-
tions of the state," it is "not totally separate from the state" for, if
it were, it would not be "part of society. '77 Similarly, John Keane
argues that because the state's role is not an unfortunate limit on
free civil society, but rather a condition for it, "sovereign state
power is an indispensable condition for the democratization of
civil society."'78 Recognizing that civil society is a terrain of con-
flict, Keane argues that
the competing claims and conflicts of interest generated by
civil society could be settled peacefully only by means of laws
which are applied universally. Since universal laws cannot
emerge spontaneously from civil society, their formulation, ap-
plication and enforcement would require a legislature, a judici-
ary and a police force, which are vital components of the state
apparatus.7
9
Even where it has all but ceased to operate as a sovereign
organism or where its empirical existence is analytically chal-
lenged as a mere artifact of the international system, enjoying
only "negative sovereignty, '80 the state system continues to de-
fine politically demarcated territorial space-and thereby the pos-
sibility of civil society. The very notion of civil society loses its
meaning if severed from the state.
I now turn to Pakistan as a paradigmatic example of a
postcolonial formation to demarcate the contours of the
75. GRAMSCI, supra note 25, at 207.
76. Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civil Society, 26 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 3, 4
(1991).
77. Id.
78. KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, Supra note 7, at 22.
79. Id.
80. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
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postcolonial state. At the end of British colonial rule in 1947, Pa-
kistan inherited the colonial state form without any structural
break to such an extent that the state is not so much a
postcolonial state as a colonial one. The military "sword arm"
and the bureaucratic "steel frame," both bequeathed by the colo-
nial state, remain the foundations of the Pakistani state, and pat-
terns of governance established to sustain colonial rule have
proved enduring.81 The resulting colonial form of the Pakistani
state has precluded consolidation of the essential building blocks
of civil society.
The leaders of the "Pakistan Movement" were not only the
products of the general milieu of the colonial encounter; they
had developed their identities and world views in close proximity
to the colonial state apparatuses and as such formed part of the
"salariat. ' ' 82 Having internalized key aspects and assumptions of
European public culture that furnished the bases of their elite
status, they were well-versed in the modern imperative in-
separably interlinking the nation, the state, and political sover-
eignty, with the nation posited as the master identity that
subsumes other identifications. However, the geographical and
demographic disjunction between the nation they posited and the
state they came to rule ensured that the colonial form would re-
main intact. August 14, 1947 (day of Pakistan's formal indepen-
dence), thus, inaugurated another variant of colonial rule.
Termed variously as the "viceregal model,"83 the "overdeveloped
state,"'84 the "hyper-extended state, 8s5 and "praetotrian state,
'86
Pakistan rested on the rule of difference. Based on an essential-
81. See AYESHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKI-
STAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENCE (C.A. Bayly et al. eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1990); TAN TAI YONG, GARRISON STATE: THE MILITARY, GOVERNMENT AND
SOCIETY IN COLONIAL PUNJAB, 1849-1947 (Bipan Chandra et al. eds., 2005).
82. Hamza Alavi, Formation of the Social Structure of South Asia Under the
Impact of Colonialism, in SOUTH ASIA (SOCIOLOGY OF "DEVELOPING SOCIETIES") 5
(Hamza Alavi & John Hariss eds., 1989). Gandhi, who was a product of the same
milieu and belonged to the same strata, pined to "discipline" the "unmanageable,"
"uncontrollable," "undisciplined," mob. According to him "[t]he great task before
the nation today is to discipline its demonstrations ...." Again, "[tihe nation must
be disciplined to handle mass movements in a sober and methodical manner." Yet
again, "[w]e can do no effective work unless we can pass instructions to the crowd
and expect implicit obedience." M.K. GANDHI, 18 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MA-
HATMA GANDHI 240-42, 275 (1958), quoted in Guha, supra note 56, at 139-40.
83. See KHALID B. SAYEED, PAKISTAN: THE FORMATIVE PHASE, 1857-1948 (2d
ed. 1968).
84. See Hamza Alavi, The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Ban-
gladesh, in IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION IN SOUTH ASIA 145 (Kathleen Gough &
Hari P. Sharma eds., 1973).
85. See Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Security as Hegemony, 21 ALTERNATIVES 283
(1996).
86. See Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Set-
tings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L.
REV. 1225 (1993).
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ized difference between the ruling elite and the natives, particu-
larly the Bengalis, the state remained non-hegemonic, with
coercion always outweighing persuasion in its claim of domina-
tion. Attempts to constitute a state-nation and the denial of fed-
eralism, suppression of representation, and destruction of
alterity, were the hallmarks of the new state from its very incep-
tion. The state's primary project of "conjuring Pakistan ' 87 is by
using "security as hegemony. ' 88 Denial of citizenship rights to
East Bengalis, who constituted a majority of the population,
quickly became the defining feature of the new state. This imper-
ative translated into the military-bureaucratic oligarchy's domi-
nation of the ruling power bloc, extra-constitutional usurpations
of power, and the absence of liberal rights of speech, assembly,
and association. Dissent and resistance were countered by unbri-
dled state violence, including military actions-the most infamous
being the 1971 genocide in East Bengal.8 9 As in classic colonial
rule, members of the polity remained subjects, denied the rights
and opportunities to become citizens.
The law in Pakistan has functioned as it would in any colo-
nial form: to furnish legitimacy to the rule of difference; to thwart
the principle of popular representation; and to facilitate the era-
sure of identifications other than those sanctioned by the omni-
present state. Deploying doctrines of "civil necessity,"
"revolutionary legality," "constitutional deviation," and "de
facto power," the courts have consistently furnished legitimacy to
repressive political orders. 90 The judiciary has remained an influ-
ential fragment of the dominant power bloc, and judicial pro-
nouncements are animated by the guiding principle that
obedience is owed to de facto power. The judiciary thus plays a
vital constitutive role in the formation of an authoritarian state
that rules subjugated and silenced subjects. 91
Through the use of coercive and ideological apparatuses, the
Pakistani state has sought to achieve unrestricted domination
over society. It aspires to attain not only relative autonomy from
society through comprehensive instruments of political control,
but also suzerainty, if not monopoly, extending over social and
economic vectors of accumulation. The regulatory infrastructure
of the colonial state was extended and deepened to include mar-
87. Ayesha Jalal, Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining, 27 IN 'L J.
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 73 (1995).
88. Pasha, supra note 85, at 283.
89. See MOHAMMAD WASEEM, POLITICS AND THE STATE IN PAKISTAN 266-96
(1989); HAMID KHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PAKISTAN
406-30 (2001).
90. Mahmud, supra note 37, at 49.
91. See id.; PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL POLITICS IN PAKISTAN (1995).
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ket monopolies, state cooperatives, administered prices in key
sectors, direct control of vital industries, licensing of many eco-
nomic activities, and close monitoring of external trade. Wedded
to development models prescribed by modernization theory
92
and peddled by international development agencies, 93 the state
in Pakistan quickly became an instrument of class production.
Through a regime of permits, licenses, bonus vouchers, tax holi-
days and protectionist barriers, a crony capitalist class was cre-
ated. Relatively weak and beholden to the state that created and
sustained it, this class has remained incapable and unwilling to
play the classic role of the bourgeoisie in creating public spheres
and other foundations of civil society. The uneven development
of different sectors that was initiated under colonial rule remains
the dominant feature of the economy. Important segments of the
economy retain non-capitalist modes of production, which keep a
majority of the population outside the purview of a system of
needs based on autonomy, self-determination, contract, and free-
dom of entry and exit. Consequently, extra-economic factors re-
main integral to relations of production, and mediation between
non-urban social groups and the state is conducted primarily by
feudal landowners, tribal chiefs, and spiritual leaders.
In Pakistan, the formal Weberian traits presumed in the im-
age of the modern state-impersonality of office, uniform applica-
tion of rules, predictability of behavior, rationality of
organization-are interpreted by a radically different set of patri-
monial practices. The result is a state in the colonial form supple-
mented by varying degrees of patrimonialism. Following the
partition of India and the resulting mass migrations, the disposal
of evacuee property in Pakistan furnished an opportunity to
abuse state power for personal gain-a trait that quickly became
entrenched. The endemic corruption of political elites and the
military-bureaucratic oligarchy can be seen as the price that the
state's struggle against society extracts from all: ineffective gov-
ernment and the institutionalization of mechanisms for extracting
resources for personal gain. The offices of the state are treated as
if they were grants by decentralized patrimonial states that could
be appropriated and exploited by their occupants to benefit
themselves and their constituents. The rule of law, a canonical
92. See Tariq Banuri, Modernization and its Discontents: A Cultural Perspective
on Theories of Development, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CUL-
TURE AND RESISTANCE 73 (Fr6d6rique Apffel Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds.,
1990); ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UN-
MAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (1995).
93. THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree
eds., 1997).
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enabling condition of civil society, is an early casualty of these
practices.
The implications for the state-civil society ensemble are
enormous, particularly as it relates to the mode of articulation
between the two. Whereas in modern Europe the political inclu-
sion of the lower classes took an integrative mode marked by a
relatively horizontal inclusion of the people in the national politi-
cal arena, in Pakistan, as in many postcolonial societies, the inte-
gration mode is that of patron/client relationships or charismatic
populism. 94 This mode of integration brings people into the polit-
ical process via their insertion into personalized and highly par-
ticularistic patron-client networks. Such networks cut across and
undermine more horizontal forms of political organization like
trade unions or parties that are primarily based on universalistic
criteria of recruitment. The populist mode mobilizes and in-
troduces people into the political process via the masses' attach-
ment to a leader whose charisma becomes the major source of
legitimation and whose organization becomes the main link be-
tween private interests and the public sphere. 95 These modes of
political integration preclude the growth of autonomous associa-
tional life composed of free and unattached individuals who may
articulate private interests. In the absence of such autonomous
associations, a viable civil society cannot exist.
The pervasiveness of the ideological apparatuses of the
Pakistani state also precludes development of a robust civil soci-
ety. The state is the dominant force in the cultural sphere. All
levels of education and mediums of mass communication are
controlled or closely regulated by the state. Of particular impor-
tance here is the interpenetration of religion and the state. To
ground its myths of origin, facilitate formation of a state-nation,
and thwart dissent, the Pakistani state from its very inception
deployed religion as an instrument of public policy. The state be-
came a veritable theologian that sought explicitly to define for
social actors the fashion in which they must see and interpret
themselves and the world. In so doing, the theologian-state er-
ected itself as the constitutive principal creating the language and
94. See SHAHID JAVED BURKI, PAKISTAN UNDER THE MILITARY: ELEVEN
YEARS OF ZIA UL-HAQ (Westview Press 1991); SHAHID JAVED BURKI, PAKISTAN
UNDER BHUTTO, 1971-1977 (1980); MOHAMMAD WASEEM, POLITICS AND THE
STATE IN PAKISTAN (Progressive Publishers 1989).
95. See ALTAF GAUHAR, AYUB KHAN: PAKISTAN'S FIRST MILITARY RULER (2d
ed. 1993); HASSAN GARDEZI AND JAMIL RASHID, PAKISTAN, THE RooTs OF DICTA-
TORSHIP: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRAETORIAN STATE (Hassan Gardezi &
Jamil Rashid eds., 1983); PHILIP E. JONES, THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES PARTY: RISE TO
POWER (Oxford Univ. Press 2003); STANLEY WOLPERT, ZULFI BHUTFO: HIS LIFE
AND TIMES (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); LAWRENCE ZIRING, PAKISTAN: AT THE
CROSSCURRENT OF HISTORY (2003).
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myths of social formation. The result has been an erasure of any
public/private distinction, a preclusion of secularism, the preven-
tion of individual freedom and autonomy, and the absence of a
legal order founded upon an entrenched regime of rights-all es-
sential building blocks of civil society.
Enthusiasts of civil society must also square the pervasive
political deployment of religion by the Pakistani state with the
proposition that "[clivil society ... does not translate into Islamic
terms." 96 In Europe the emergence of civil society was enabled
by historical moves towards secularism, individualism, and plu-
ralism. The project of Islamic revivalism, however, remains
"[u]nsoiled by history, not subject to any substantive effect of
temporality[;] this quest for purity presents itself as a fastidious
and rigorous adherence to a body of textual material which ex-
cludes reference, or at least normative reference, to anything
else."'97 The prime category in the Islamic notion of society is that
of unity. An organicist and vitalist model of the body politic is
proffered: a healthy society is one in which its various compo-
nents, both individual and corporate, are functionally interde-
pendent and in accord with the purpose, or the teleological
terminus, of being a polity envisioned by the invariant textual
referents. The vital principle of unity and presumed cohesion of
the body politic envisages "solidaristic corporatism. '' 98 Islam is
posited as "self-enclosed, impenetrable in its essence, and [as] a
substance presupposed by history rather than being its prod-
uct." 99 The notion of a body social or civil society remains "ab-
sent from Islamic political thought except as an abstract locus of
order and disorder which receives the action of dawla [the state],
and is only implicitly conceived in Islamic law."'100
The Pakistani state's incremental but unmistakable moves to
render rules of public and private conduct subservient to ortho-
dox readings of foundational Islamic texts have serious implica-
tions for the emergence of civil society. The "Islamization"
agenda of the state precludes subjectification of individuals as
free and autonomous and renders liberal civil rights illusory even
when formally enumerated in the constitution. 10 1 Furthermore,
over the last decade, the state-orchestrated rhetoric of "Islamiza-
tion" has facilitated the proliferation of armed and organized pri-
96. Serif Mardin, Civil Society and Islam, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY,
COMPARISON 278, 279 (John A. Hall ed., 1995).
97. Az=z AL-AZMEH, ISLAMS AND MODERNITIES 77 (1993).
98. TAHA PARLA, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ZIYA GOKALP,
1876-1924 (1985).
99. AL-AZMEH, supra note 97, at 84.
100. Id. at 90.
101. See Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion & Religious Minorities in Paki-
stan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 40 (1995).
HeinOnline  -- 26 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 63 2006
CHICANA/O-LATINAJO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:41
vate militias committed to establishing a theocracy. The
escalating inter-sectarian violence that these militias have fos-
tered has spawned a political culture of fear and silence. Appro-
priating the state-sponsored rhetoric of "Islamization" and
threatening the use of force, these fundamentalist militias have
often blackmailed the state into extra-constitutional declarations
acknowledging the Sharia [Islamic Law] as the only law in areas
controlled by them.10 2 Besides raising critical questions about
state sovereignty and constitutional order, these ominous devel-
opments negate the depersonalization of violence in favor of the
territorial juridical state-a fundamental prerequisite of civil
society.
In summary, the nature of the state in Pakistan precludes
development of a robust civil society. The colonial state-form,
along with the military "sword arm" and the bureaucratic "steal
frame" bequeathed by colonial rule, remains intact. Resting its
claim of domination on coercion, this state has preserved non-
capitalist modes of production, failed to establish the rule of law,
denied civil and political rights to the majority of the people,
deployed religion as a means of containing dissent, and proved
unable or unwilling to control personalized, private violence. The
search for civil society (as posited by canonical Western texts), is,
in this context, an exercise in futility. Proponents of the existence
of civil society in Pakistan typically rest their claim on some par-
ticular new social development such as the rise of non-govern-
mental organizations, activist women's groups, or the growth of
print media. While all of these developments have significant po-
litical and cultural implications, they remain confined to rela-
tively small sections of the population. More importantly, [as the
above analysis demonstrated] the preconditions and features of
civil society constitute a comprehensive package that includes
overlapping developments in the economic, legal, political, and
cultural spheres. Isolated pockets of civil society-like activities
can be identified in almost any society in almost any historical
period. Claiming the existence of viable civil society whenever
one discerns an isolated site of civil-society-like process is akin to
the proverbial blindfolded man describing the elephant by touch-
ing a single part of its body.
Still, others who acknowledge that civil society in Pakistan at
best remains embryonic and fragile nevertheless hope that it will
mature and strengthen in time if pockets of non-governmental
social action continue to multiply. This raises the question of
102. See HASSAN ABBAS, PAKISTAN'S DRIFT INTO EXTREMEISM: ALLAH, THE
ARMY AND AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR (2004); HUSAIN HAQQANI, PAKISTAN: BE-
TWEEN MOSQUE AND MILITARY (The Brookings Inst. Press 2005).
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whether civil society can be achieved in the face of a hyper-ex-
tended state. Even Keane, a leading advocate of civil society,
sees civil society and the state as "the condition of each other's
democratization."'10 3 He acknowledges that "[s]ince universal
laws cannot emerge spontaneously from civil society, their for-
mulation, application and enforcement would require a legisla-
ture, a judiciary and a police force, which are vital components of
a state apparatus."'10 4 If, however, the autonomy of civil society
is, as Keane says, to be "legally guaranteed," who but the state
will be the guarantor?
Pierre Rosanvallon proposes a strategy of "bringing society
closer to itself" through "an effort to fill out society, to increase
its density by creating more and more intermediate locations ful-
filling social functions, and by encouraging individual involve-
ment in networks of direct mutual support.' 10 5 He admits,
however, that "there is no way in which the state itself can be
instrumental in bringing about such a reconstitution of soci-
ety. °106 That would require the state to voluntarily reduce its
scope and power, something that, whatever its rhetoric, the mod-
ern state does not do. Rosanvallon is content to urge the state to
be more "pluralist" in its conception of law, and to bring in a new
category of "social law" that would enable "segments of civil so-
ciety" to be "recognized as legal subjects and enjoy the right to
establish laws independent of state law. 10 7 He fails, however, to
offer an account of how or why an entrenched state would relin-
quish its power as sovereign lawmaker. All he can do is paint a
grim scenario in which, if the requisite initiatives are not forth-
coming, the result would be "a bastard society in which ever
stronger market mechanisms will coexist with rigid statist forms
and the growth of a selective social corporatism."'' 0 8 This scena-
rio represents Pakistan's predicament well.
The deeper question remains whether the resurrection of the
concept of civil society is necessary or useful. If the objective is to
contain unbridled state power, promote pluralism, recognize cul-
tural diversity, and entrench political representation and ac-
countability, we have available in the popular imagination,
concepts of justice, accountability of rulers, social harmony, deci-
sion-making by collective consensus and reciprocal rights and ob-
ligations between the individual and the community. If the
103. KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 15.
104. Id. at 22.
105. Pierre Rosanvallon, The Decline of Social Visibility, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND
THE STATE: NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 199, 206.
106. Id. at 204.
107. Id. at 205.
108. Id. at 217.
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central political question in Pakistan is the colonial form of the
omnipresent state, the primary agenda of progressive forces must
be the comprehensive contestation of the state. Locating this
contest in the minor pockets of civil society would be self-defeat-
ing. We need to conceptualize the terrain of this struggle in line
with the history of political struggles in their settings.
In the turbulent political history of Pakistan, resistance to
the state has never been spearheaded by the civil society. Bengali
intelligentsia, Baluchi tribesmen, Sindhi peasants, Muhajir stu-
dents and educated women have at various times furnished the
grammar of democratic struggle in Pakistan. Landmark political
transitions have been driven by the periodic congealing of di-
verse strata of society in "the popular upsurge,"'10 9 an ephemeral
activist coalition through which various social groups momenta-
rily suspend divergent interests in favor of the common goal of
removing an incumbent regime. This experience precludes the
proposition that there is, or should be, a unitary entity that
stands apart from, and in opposition to, the state-the two being
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the social space. We
should focus instead on the modalities that enable the state, and
that which is not the state, to be discursively and materially con-
stituted. This process would enable us to identify a myriad of
non-state social groupings-citizens, communities, social groups,
coalitions, classes, interest groups, ethnicities, nationalities and
parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Civil society is indeed an elusive concept. Forged on the an-
vil of modern European history and reported in the annals of
European social theory, the concept of civil society is anchored
in the consolidation of capitalism as the dominant mode of pro-
duction. Autonomous individuals, a legal order based on liberal
rights, secularization of culture, depersonalization of violence,
pervasive associational life and forums of free public discourse
are its essential building blocks. Civil society, then, is a sphere
within modern forms of social life; its comprehensive flowering is
limited to social formations where capitalism and a liberal politi-
cal order become entrenched. An against-the-grain reading of
the archive, however, shows that the concept covers up the pro-
cess of disciplining and subordination of the masses in the name
of making them civil(ized).
109. GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRA-
CIEs 53-56 (1986).
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Even if the conventional understanding of civil society were
valid, its viability in postcolonial formations remains elusive. This
is because colonialism, the infamous truncated project of moder-
nity, precluded civil society from taking root in the colonies.
Founded on conquest rather than consent, the colonial state
rested its claims of domination on coercion and institutionally es-
sentialized differences between the ruler and the ruled. The na-
tive remained subjected to power, denied representation and
citizenship. Growth of capitalism was restricted to selected sec-
tors of the economy; non-capitalist modes of production were
preserved, reinforced, and articulated with a regime of global ac-
cumulation. This milieu could produce only an anemic civil soci-
ety limited to some sections of urban modernized elites.
Following the negotiated "transfer of power," Pakistan, like
most postcolonial formations, inherited colonial state appara-
tuses and forms of governance. This lineage combined with geo-
graphical and demographic anomalies of the new polity to cause
the retention, even consolidation, of the colonial form. Domi-
nated by a military-bureaucratic oligarchy, the coercive and ideo-
logical apparatuses sought complete domination of society. The
denial of representation, suppression of diversity, formation of a
state-nation, and abuse of state power for personal gain quickly
became the defining features of the over-extended state. Major
sectors of the economy remained non-capitalist, and a class of
crony-capitalists was nurtured to preside over the limited capital-
ist sphere. The judiciary furnished legitimacy, cynical use of relig-
ion was orchestrated by the state to silence dissent, and brute
force was deployed to contain resistance. This state of affairs
leaves little room for the growth and consolidation of civil
society.
Edward Said, who alerted us to the constitutive and domi-
nating power of orientalism and colonial rule, also reminds us
that "[i]n human history there is always something beyond the
reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate
society, and this is obviously what makes change possible." 110 In
postcolonial formations one does discern pockets of resistance to
both the domineering state and the neo-liberal project. These
pockets of resistance often spawn robust new social movements
that have an agenda of peace, justice, dignity, and community.
Whether this agenda is accomplished depends to a great measure
upon our willingness and ability to break free from the straight-
jacket of Eurocentric unilinear evolutionism. Only such a break
will enable us to imagine forms of collective life worthy of being
called human and complete the project of de-colonization.
110. EDWARD W. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRITIC 246-47 (1983).
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